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Abstract
In this paper, we combine the multi-department structure which characterises
universities with the multitasking nature of the academic’s incentive problem. We
show by mean of an example that a conglomerate structure in the university may
actually be instrumental in inducing high efforts from the academic in its two basic
activities. Accordingly, depending on the shape of its preference, the university may
implement various combinations of teaching and research outputs by altering the
incentive package it offers to academics.
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1 Introduction
Universities count teaching and research as part of their core social goals and, in
an ideal world, one would like to see any university to excel in both dimensions. As
a matter of fact, universities may also specialize on the mass teaching segment or
the research oriented one and very little is known about how effective universities
are in achieving either the ideal of combining teaching and research or the more
limited objectives they retain. While some evidences from UK (see Shattock, 2002)
point to universities which perform very well in research as well as in teaching, it
is hard to obtain a more general picture, i.e. to see what happens exactly in those
less prestigious universities. The situation is even more opaque in many continental
systems where university assessment is in its very enfancy. As argued by Neary et al.
(2003), it is widely accepted that ”...poor governance structures and inappropriate
incentives...still characterize so many European Universities” (p. 1240).
Combining high quality teaching and high quality research is actually desirable
for the universities themselves, in particular in a system where universities are mostly
financed on a per student basis and where students’ choice depends on (1) teaching
quality and (2) university’s prestige (which is related to research quality). However,
combining high quality teaching and high quality research is often viewed as a source
of conflict within universities taken as an aggregate. And as a matter of fact, one
may observe that some institutions tend to specialize into teaching activities while
others are mostly known for their research achievements.
An obvious reason why research and teaching objectives look conflictual is that
at the individual level, an academic cannot perform the two tasks simultaneously.
The share of an academic’s time which goes to teaching cannot go for research and
vice versa. While part of the problem might be solved at the level of a university
by specialising academics’ tasks, it is often believed that full specialization is not
desirable because the activities are complementary in nature. More fundamentally,
the tensions between teaching and research activities come from the fact that teach-
ing activities is a crucial source of revenues for universities, especially in continental
Europe where the bulk of an institution’s budget comes from subsidies and tuition
fees that are directly related to the number of students. Under such a financing rule,
teaching is costly because it leaves less time for research but it is nevertheless prof-
itable, and necessary, because it raises money which may ultimately finance research.
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Notice that a key feature of such a system is the existence of cross-subzidization from
teaching sectors to research ones.
Very different factors contribute to explain the universities’ actual choice re-
garding research and teaching quality levels. Among those, the preferences of the
universities, their culture, play a crucial role: some universities count mass teaching
as their primary mission and will particularly emphasize on that dimension while
others will try to excel in their research activities, and might devote little attention
to their teaching duties. But the choice of teaching and research level is for sure
a constrained one. Even for a university which wants to focus a lot on research,
completely neglecting teaching is not possible when the financing of higher educa-
tion institutions is based mainly on the number of students. Although the resulting
trade-off between teaching and research activities has not been widely investigated
in the literature, recent contributions in the area definitely put the budget constraint
at the heart of the analysis, i.e. the way they formalize the university governance
problem is essentially a matter of raising funds on the teaching side to spend money
on research activities (see Beath et al (2005)).
Del Rey (2001) models competition between universities who decide on the al-
location of funds between teaching and research activities. In her model, teaching
achievements and research records enter the university objective function and fund-
ing is positively related to the number of students. She studies the balance between
research and teaching efforts as a function of the funding rules, which actually deter-
mine the scope for research through the financing raised on students. De Fraja and
Iossa (2002) point out that the increased students’ mobility favors the emergence of
”elite” institutions, i.e. a limited number of high research records universities co-
existing with other universities focusing on teaching activities. In these two papers,
the presence of competition between universities is central to the argument. Beath
et al. (2003) focus on the tensions between pure and applied research under binding
budget constraints. However, the teaching side of the academics’ job is not consid-
ered in their paper. Beath et al. (2005) analyze the impact of the higher education
funding on the universities’ choice regarding teaching and research intensities. In
particular, they study the impact of a research quality based funding for the aca-
demics1 on research and teaching level. They show that an increase in the research
quality related funding (and a corresponding decrease in the per student subsidy)
1Like the research assessment exercises periodically performed in the UK.
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leads to the specialization of universities in either -world class- research and min-
imal quality teaching or minimal research and higher quality teaching. University
specialization implies that there is no longer universities that perform (fairly) good
in both dimensions.
A common feature of the above mentioned papers is their focus on external
forces to explain the organization of teaching and research within universities. In
the present paper, we focus instead on the internal organization of the university
and specifically on its implication for the coexistence of teaching and research ac-
tivities. The paper is organized around two simple ideas. First, universities are
active in several disciplines and typically organize teaching and research by rely-
ing on departments. Most often though, the budget is centralized and the resource
constraint applies at the university level. It means that the allocation of resources
is done at the university level too. Thus, universities rely on an internal financing
system which is very similar to the internal capital market of a conglomerate firm
(see Coupe´, 2001). Second, within each departments, academics have to perform
both research and teaching activities. While they choose the efforts they put in
these two tasks, their choices might be governed by the incentives schemes provided
by the authority. In this sense, the possible conflict between teaching and research
is akin to a multitasking problem.
In Gautier and Wauthy (2007) we study in details the extent to which incentive
schemes can be designed to take advantage of the conglomerate structure of multi-
department universities. We show in particular that internal financing rules can be
used to create yardstick competition and thereby enhance both teaching and research
efforts. In this paper, we develop an example in which we show that depending on
the shape of its preference, the university may implement various combinations of
teaching and research outputs by altering the incentive package it offers to academics.
2 Model
We consider a university composed of N departments. Each department is respon-
sible for adding to the stock of knowledge in its field through research activities and
for disseminating that stock through its teaching activities. The quality of research
and the quality of teaching of a department depend on the human and the financial
resources spent on each task. In each department, there is a unique academic who
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is responsible of research and the teaching efforts.
The research output of department i, denoted hereafter by Ri, is defined as Ri =
ri(bi)1−h, where ri is the research effort of the academic i and bi is the research budget
of the department. We further assume h < 1 so that the marginal productivity of
money is decreasing. Notice that a larger value for h means that, other things being
equal, money is less essential as an input for research.
Student’s enrollment in department i increases with the teaching quality. The
latter being a function of the teaching effort exerted by the academic i. If we denote
the teaching effort in department i by ti, we assume that the number of students
enrolled in that department (ni) is ni = ti.
Each student registered in the university contributes to the university budget by
an amount s¯. s¯ is the sum of the student’s tuition fee and the government per-student
subsidy (if any). The overall budget of the university B is then B = s¯
∑N
k=1 nk + F
where F represents all the university resources which are not tied to the number
of students. B is entirely redistributed to departments as research funds. The
departments have no other resources than those coming from the university’s central
budget.
The allocation of resources to departments is decided at the university level by
its central authority. The allocation of B to the departments will be based on two
different criteria. A fraction γ of the university’s budget B will be distributed to
departments according to the relative qualities of their research projects, that is a
research-based allocation of funds. The remaining fraction 1 − γ will be allocated
according the relative qualities of the teaching programs, that is a student-based
allocation of funds. In particular, we assume that each department i receives a
research budget bi given by:
bi =
(
γ
ri∑N
k=1 rk
+ (1− γ) ti∑N
k=1 tk
)
B (2.1)
Let us call αi = ri∑N
k=1
rk
and βi = ti∑N
k=1
tk
; hence bi = (γαi + (1− γ)βi)B.
The above expression stresses the fact that in our model, it is indeed the rel-
ative quality of teaching and research which matters. Notice also that we assume
all departments to be identical. Therefore they will exert the same efforts. This
allows us to focus precisely on the role that can assigned to competition accross
departments per se.2 Hence, at the equilibrium we will have αi = βi = 1N ∀i and
2We of course acknowledge that the existence of a significant heterogeneity among academic
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all the academics will have the same research budget bi = BN = s¯ti +
F
N . However,
the university’s financing rule (γ) will have an impact on the incentives to perform
tasks and therefore on the efforts level as we will explain in the next section. A key
feature of the the paper is the assumption that departments react to incentives and
that the allocation of financial resources influences their choices of effort in both the
teaching and the research task.
An academic i derives a private benefit from his research output. These private
benefits are for example, notoriety, promotion, job opportunities,... By contrast,
we assume that the academic does not derive any private benefit from his teaching
achievement i.e it does not pay to be a good teacher. Accordingly, the academic’s
utility function is defined as follows:
Ui = ωRi − t
2
i + r
2
i
2
, (2.2)
where ωRi is the private benefit the academic enjoys when he achieves a research
output Ri and
t2i+r
2
i
2 is the cost of performing a teaching effort ti and a research
effort ri.
The specification of the academic’s problem is of course extreme. It clearly
makes the worst case for teaching effort in the sense that the only channel through
which teaching efforts can be incentivized rests on the funding it raises for research.
Notice also that this specification of the academic’s preferences fits reasonably well
with the view of a market for academics where research outputs are more valuable
than teaching abilities: while research outputs are easily evaluated, and attached
to individuals through external peer reviewing processes, teaching efforts are less
easily transferred out of the institution and are thereby less valuable in the market.
Notice also that we assume that there are no synergies, either positive or negative,
between research and teaching efforts.
2.1 Incentives
Each academic i will select the level of efforts (ti, ri) in order to maximize his/her
utility. Integrating the university’s financing rule in the utility function, each aca-
demic i solves:
max
ti,ri
ωri
(
(γ
ri∑N
k=1 rk
+ (1− γ) ti∑N
k=1 tk
)B
)1−h
− t
2
i
2
− r
2
i
2
(2.3)
departments may actually play a very significant role.
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For convenience, we consider that the university’s budget has no other resources
than those coming from the students, that is F = 0. The first order conditions of
the above problem read as follows:
ti = ωri(1− h) (bi)−h
(
(γαi + (1− γ)βi)∂B
∂ti
+B(1− γ)∂βi
∂ti
)
(2.4)
ri = ω(bi)1−h + ωri(1− h)b−hi
(
γB
∂αi
∂ri
)
. (2.5)
Integrating the fact that all academics are identical, that is ti = t, ri = r, ∀i =
1, ..., N , the first order conditions can be expressed as:
t = ωrs¯1−h(1− h)t−hg1(N, γ), (2.6)
r = ωs¯1−ht1−hg2(N, γ), (2.7)
where g1(N, γ) =
( γ
N + (1− γ)
)
and g2(N, γ) =
(
1 + N−1N γ(1− h)
)
. In these first
order conditions, the left hand sides are the marginal costs of respectively teaching
and research efforts, the right hand sides are the marginal benefits of these two tasks.
We are now in a position to discuss the incentive effect of the financing rule i.e. how
the marginal benefit of each task is affected by the structure of university. This is
the object of our first proposition.
PROPOSITION 2.1
1. The efforts on the two tasks are complements.
2. The marginal benefit of teaching effort is decreasing with the number of aca-
demics N and with γ.
3. The marginal benefit of research effort is increasing with the number of aca-
demics N and with γ.
Part 1 of the proposition states that the effort on one task stimulates the effort on the
other task. Recall that the production of research output requires the combination
of two inputs: research effort and research funds. Notice then that research funds
in department i increase with the teaching effort in that department, though in
a proportion that depends on the university’s financing rule. Since the marginal
productivity of each of these two inputs increases with the quantity available of the
other input, more effort on one task increases the incentives to supply effort on the
other task i.e. teaching and research efforts are complements. Importantly, this
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complementarity is created by the university’s financing rule since it establishes a
link between teaching effort and research funding. Hence, even if the two tasks are
independent in the academic’s cost function, the university’s financing rules create
a complementarity between the two tasks.
The logic behind the model is best captured by considering the marginal benefit
of teaching. In this respect, the conglomerate structure of the university might be a
problem. Indeed it is likely to weaken incentives towards teaching. Redistribution
of funds between departments lowers the academics’ incentives to contribute to the
university’s budget i.e. to attract students through a high quality teaching. The
benefit of an additional student - the additional tuition fee- will be redistributed to
the N departments of the university and the academic will receive only a fraction
γαi + (1 − γ)βi < 1. Clearly, the fact that the academic does not fully capture
the benefit of his/her teaching effort hurts the incentives. This effect is particularly
important when N is large because each academic receives a fraction 1N of the total
budget. It is also more important when γ is larger. The parameter γ is an important
incentive tool that has a dual impact on incentives: negative for teaching and positive
for research. A large γ means that competition for research fund is intense and
it therefore stimulates the incentives to perform research effort. More efforts on
research might then induce more efforts on teaching because of complementarity.
Conversely, a low γ means that a large fraction of the budget is secured in the
department that managed to attract the students and as such, it is a strong incentive
for teaching effort.
We are now equipped to characterize the optimal effort levels and study their
dependence to the basic parameters of the model.
2.2 Efforts
Using equations (2.6) ,(2.7), it is immediate to obtain:
t∗ = t¯
[
g1(γ,N)
1
2h g2(γ,N)
1
2h
]
(2.8)
r∗ = r¯
[
g1(γ,N)
1
h g2(γ,N)
1−h
h
]
(2.9)
where t¯ and r¯ denote the optimal values for efforts in the limiting case where N = 1
and γ = 0, i.e. in the case where there is only one department (i.e. no redistribution
takes place) and funding is exclusively depending on students’ enrollment. Direct
computations indicate:
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PROPOSITION 2.2
1. The optimal teaching effort (t∗) decreases with the number of academics N
and decreases with γ.
2. (a) If h ≥ 12 , the optimal research effort (r∗) increases with the number of
academics N and increases with γ.
(b) If h < 12 , the optimal research effort either always increases with γ and
N or is non-monotonic
-
6
t∗, r∗
t¯
r¯
γ
0 1
r∗
t∗ -
6
t∗, r∗
N
t¯
r¯
1
r∗
t∗
h ≥ 12 h ≥ 12
-
6
t∗, r∗
t¯
r¯
γ
0 1γ∗
r∗
t∗ -
6
t∗, r∗
N
t¯
r¯
1 n∗
r∗
t∗
h < 12 h <
1
2
Notice that when h is small the shape of r∗ is non-monotonic. Recall indeed
that a smaller h actually means that the marginal contribution of money to research
output is large, other things being equal. Since the positive effect of the conglom-
erate structure on research efforts hangs on the presence of yardstick competition
between departments, the effect is very quickly eroded whenever a small part of the
total budget is subject to research competition (γ is large) or when the benefits of
competition are widely diluted (N is large).
2.3 Production Frontiers
We explained in the previous section how different organizational structures for
a university - both in term of number of academics/departments and in term of
financing rule γ- result in different levels of teaching and research efforts. Our
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model also allows to characterize the different output combinations the university
can achieve a a function of the internal organization it endorses. Our university
produces two different outputs: graduated students in quantity t∗ and scientific
research in quantity R in each of the N departments. Notice that when we measure
the teaching output by the number of students only, we put aside an important
dimension of teaching: the students’ acquired ability when they exit university. The
latter depends obviously on teaching quality but also on the student’s ability at
the entrance and on the (average) quality of the cohort (peer effect). Most often,
universities are not indifferent to the types of student they enroll. However, we
neglect these (important!) effects in our framework and the university does not
actively control the admission policy. Instead, the university has to enroll all the
students which apply, irrespective of their ability at the entrance. In this sense,
our model more specifically applies to university systems where the university have
the mission of mass teaching and cannot control the ability of the enrolled students
through exams and/or tuition fees.
For a given number of departments N , depending on the internal financing rule
γ, the university achieves an output combination (n,R) equals to (t∗, r∗(s¯t∗)1−h).
Proposition (2.2) tells us that when γ increases, n decreases. There are less students
and therefore less funds for research. But it does not necessarily mean that the
research output decreases because a decrease in research fund is compensated by an
increase in the research effort (at least in those parameter space where r∗ increases
with γ). Direct computations indicate the following:
PROPOSITION 2.3 The research output increases in γ for γ ∈ [0,Min[1, γ˜]]
where γ˜ = nn−1
1−h+h2
5−9h+4h2
Accordingly, our model leads to the identification of a production possibility
frontier for the university
We are now in position to represent the production frontier of a university with
N departments. The following figure represents the combination of output that a
university can achieve as a function of its internal financing rule γ. Notice that
we restrict attention here to that part of the frontier which is decreasing in the
n−R space, i.e. that part along which there is a real trade-off between research and
teaching.
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Thus, depending on their preferences for the two-dimensions of the output, the
universities will choose different financing rules. For example, a university that value
teaching a lot and emphasizes less research will select point A, while a university
that is more interested in research and less in teaching will choose point B.
3 Final Remarks
This paper has shown that the allocation of the research budget to departments
affects the academics’ incentives to exert teaching and research efforts. Incentives, in
turn, affect the effort levels and finally the output. Depending on their preferences
for the research achievement and for the number of students the universities will
choose different financing rules. A university which is more focused on attracting
a lot of students will choose a low value of γ (i.e. a research budget based mainly
on the number of students) while a university more focused on research will choose
a higher value of γ to create more competition for research funds and to stimulate
the research efforts. The choice of internal financing rules thus reflects the balance
between teaching and research in the objective function, or more precisely in the
preferences, of the university. In this respect, our results complements those of Beath
et al. (2005) who study the teaching-research trade-off when universities possibly
face different financing systems.
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